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OUT TO SAVE THE WORLD:
THE INTERSECTION OF ANIMAL WELFARE
LAW, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, AND RESPECT
FOR FRAGILE ECOSYSTEMS
STACEY GORDON STERLING*

“Nature and its vital contributions to people, which together
embody biodiversity and ecosystem functions and services,
are deteriorating worldwide . . . . Nature is essential for
human existence and good quality of life. Most of nature’s
contributions to people are not fully replaceable, and some
are irreplaceable.”1
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1. Sandra Diaz et al., Global Assessment Report on Biodiversity and Ecosystem
Services: Summary for Policymakers, IPBES 10 (May 6, 2019), https://ipbes.net/system/
tdf/ipbes_global_assessment_report_summary_for_policymakers.pdf?file=1&type=node&id
=35329 [https://perma.cc/YH3H-W8B3].
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INTRODUCTION
Of all the living things on earth, humans have the unique ability to
destroy all life. Paradoxically, even though our lives will ultimately be
destroyed too, we also seem to have the inability to stop the destruction, or
at least a lack of will to stop it. As the daily litany of new destructions2 piles
up and both the pace and the quantity increase, each loss is buried in the pile
beneath humanity’s other problems. When humans start prioritizing, the
living environment—both flora and fauna—is often neglected, and
sometimes purposely harmed.3 Even nonliving elements of nature are
harmed. In short, humans destroy the ecosystems necessary for human
survival in order to effectuate some other human interest, a lack of balancing
that is incomprehensible.
This article turns on its head the idea that if we are better human
beings, we will behave better toward each other and other living things. This
article starts instead with the premise that if we learn to value (and treat
accordingly) all living things, we will be better human beings. Although there
are undoubtedly several social lenses through which to discuss this idea, the
intersection of animal law and environmental law provides a place, not just
for discussion, but also for action.
Specifically, there are three legal constructs at the intersection of
animal law and environmental law that could significantly reduce human
harm to nature: one should be dismantled, one should be strengthened, and
one should be reconstructed. This article starts in Part I by looking at the
dichotomy of the animal welfare and environmental movements. Although
they developed separately and have interests that often compete, the two

2. E.g., Morning Edition: In Brazil, Tens of Thousands of Fires Ravage Amazon
Rainforest, NPR (Aug. 23, 2019, 5:04 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/08/23/753642821/inbrazil-tens-of-thousands-of-fires-ravage-amazon-rainforest [https://perma.cc/A9C2-5PVA];
Seth Borenstein, UN Report: Humans Accelerating Extinction of Other Species, AP (May 6,
2019), https://www.apnews.com/aaf1091c5aae40b0a110daaf04950672 [https://perma.cc/
A9C2-5PVA]. The Amazon fires are having a devastating impact on an entire ecosystem,
including the indigenous peoples and animals that live in the forests. See Nick Paton Walsh et
al., As the Amazon Fires Rage, Members of this Indigenous Community Brace for their World
to Change, CNN (Aug. 29, 2019, 5:24 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/08/29/americas/
amazon-rainforest-fires-indigenous-community/index.html [https://perma.cc/ZN5M-BBK2];
Shreya Dasgupta, At Least 500 Jaguars Lost Their Lives or Habitat in Amazon Fires,
ECOWATCH (Sept. 26, 2019, 10:25 AM), https://www.ecowatch.com/jaguars-amazonwildfires-2640630816.html?rebelltitem=1#rebelltitem1 [https://perma.cc/RCB5-BLUL].
3. See, e.g., Morning Edition: Amazon Rainforest Fires Put a Spotlight on Illegal Land
Grabbers, NPR (Aug. 26, 2019, 5:06 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/08/26/754266197/
amazon-rainforest-fires-put-a-spotlight-on-illegal-land-grabbers
[https://perma.cc/YLR39Q3G]. The primary cause of the most recent fires in the Amazon was people clearing the land
for cattle ranches. Id. Brazilian President Bolsonaro supports the ranchers, farmers, loggers,
and even illegal miners, who are responsible for most of the deforestation and destruction of
the rainforest. Id.
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movements do intersect. Part II argues that state “ag-gag” laws4—which
provide legal cover for the animal cruelty, environmental harms, and social
injustices caused by concentrated animal feeding operations (CAFOs)5—
should be dismantled and repealed. Part III analyzes the issue of who has and
who should have constitutional standing under statutes like the Endangered
Species Act (ESA).6 These statutes that are meant to protect the environment
and animals could be more effective at doing so with both judicial and
legislative fixes to allow courts to more often consider their injuries. Finally,
Part IV tackles the role of environmental law in shifting paradigms of how
we view the human/nonhuman dichotomy in nature. Legal systems are
human constructs that can be reconstructed on a framework that redefines the
legal status of nonhuman animals and elements of nature in order to provide
ecocentric justice. In the face of some quite dire destructions and losses in
the ecosystems humans inhabit and depend on for survival, human legal
systems must safeguard nonhuman interests.
I. ANIMAL, VEGETABLE, OR MINERAL: CHARACTERIZING THE
DISTINCTION BETWEEN ANIMAL LAW AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Modern human civilization reflects a struggle between human and
nature, with humans prevailing most of the time (except, perhaps, when
confronting natural disasters), and in this context, there may be very little
difference between animal law and environmental law. Both focus on the
relationship between the human and nonhuman, be it animal, vegetable, or
mineral. These concerns are manifest in the animal welfare movement and
environmentalism, both of which use the law and other tactics to advocate
for protection of nonhuman interests. But these movements differ in what
they seek to protect.7
The animal welfare movement is narrowly focused, not just on
animals, but on individual animals. Animal law brings in aspects of almost
every other area of law: criminal law, family law, tort law, constitutional law,
consumer law, disability law, environmental law, contract law, agriculture
law, and food law. It would be easy to extend this list. Moving from legal
issues to the social movement, Tischler and Myers define the concerns of the
animal welfare movement this way:

4. E.g., Farm Animal and Research Facilities Protection Act, MONT. CODE ANN. §§
81-30-101 to 81-30-105 (2019); see also Lewis Bollard, Ag-Gag: The Unconstitutionality of
Laws Restricting Undercover Investigations on Farms, 42 Envtl. L. Rep. News & Analysis
(Envt. Law Inst.) 10,960 (Oct. 2012).
5. See Misha Mitchell, Cries from the CAFOs: A Case for Environmental Ethics, 39 J.
LEGAL PROF. 67 (2014).
6. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2018).
7. There are historical and structural differences as well as those of perspective. See
David S. Favre, Foreword to WHAT CAN ANIMAL LAW LEARN FROM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW?
xxiii, xxiii–xxviii (Randall S. Abate ed., 2015).
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The animal protection movement is comprised of people
who believe that the lives and interests of animals matter, if
not always to human beings, then to the animals themselves.
Animal advocates support the reduction or elimination of
pain, suffering, abuse, and neglect, as well as eliminating the
exploitation and unnecessary death of animals. This focus
on animals includes farmed animals, animals used in
research and testing, wildlife and captive wildlife, animals
used in entertainment, and companion animals.8
More broadly, environmentalists concern themselves with issues of
air pollution, water quality, land conservation, ecosystem protection, climate
change, and wildlife management. Tischler and Myers also define
environmentalism and its impacts:
Environmentalism pulls in diverse subjects, from
environmental justice for low-income communities and
communities of color, to ecotourism and improved
livelihoods as vehicles for conservation, to the protection of
biodiversity. Environmentalism reaches land, air, climate,
and water—from the ocean to surface water and
groundwater—and the full scope of human activities that
impact our land, water, and climate.9
As suggested by these definitions, in the context of protecting
animals, the distinction between the animal welfare movement and
environmentalism is often framed as one of scope of interest: individual
animals versus animal species and their ecosystems. This may be framed as
concern about domestic animals (including farmed animals) versus concern
about wildlife. Indeed, sometimes the interests of the two movements clash.
Consider feral cats, which are devastating to populations of wild songbirds.10
Animal welfare advocates may advocate for trap-neuter-return programs that
over time reduce the size of (or eliminate entirely) feral colonies.
Environmentalists might decry the continued loss of songbirds during that
time and advocate instead for eradication of the colony. David Favre perhaps
sounds harsh in saying that animal welfare advocates “don’t give much
priority to protection of endangered species when it conflicts with other life,”
and environmentalists rarely “see farm land ecosystems, and there is no room
8. Joyce Tischler & Bruce Myers, Animal Protection and Environmentalism: The Time
Has Come To Be More than Just Friends, in WHAT CAN ANIMAL LAW LEARN FROM
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW?, supra note 7, at 387, 389.
9. Id. at 390.
10. Scott R. Loss et al., The Impact of Free-Ranging Domestic Cats on Wildlife of the
United States, NATURE COMM. (Jan. 29, 2013), https://www.nature.com/articles/ncomms2380
[https://perma.cc/MJ39-YP7L].
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in their world to focus energy on issues of pets.”11 Nevertheless, as social
movements with disparate origins,12 they are differently focused and this is
quite likely how they see each other, if not how they see themselves.
But distinguishing the two movements also in absolute terms
suggests a false dichotomy. At least one prominent issue—farmed animals—
is a critical common concern,13 albeit from different perspectives. The animal
welfare movement is focused on the cruelty of raising animals in “factory
farms,” or CAFOs. Animal welfare advocates are concerned about the
welfare of individual animals—even hundreds of thousands of individual
animals—but there is no concern for the survival of cattle or poultry as
species. They reveal the horrors of CAFOs and slaughterhouses to demand
better treatment for animals raised for food. To be sure, in this context
environmentalists are no more concerned for the survival of cattle or poultry
as species. They are, however, troubled by the significant environmental
damage caused by CAFOs, from water pollution to the levels of methane
released by cattle that contribute to climate change,14 which does contribute
to extinction of species. But as Tischler and Myers point out, ultimately, both
environmentalists and animal welfare advocates are concerned that these
activities that endanger large numbers of individual animals do harm the
environment and do endanger species.
[H]uman activity that degrades the environment is a major
concern, not only for ecosystems, but for the many species
of animals, and the millions of individual animals who
depend on the environment for survival. Curbing these
losses—and ultimately reversing extinction trends—is a
priority for both the animal protection movement and the
environmental movement.15
For both movements, law is perhaps the most effective tool to
effectuate the ecological and ethical change they seek. Yet for both, a deeply
ingrained legal tenet is also the most profound impediment to affecting
change: legally, nonhuman animals—be they domestic or wild—are
property.16 Neither nonhuman animals nor any other living environmental
entity has any inherent value under the law. They are either private property
or public property and are only as valuable as they are to their human owners.
Laws that protect property are only as effective as the damages assigned for

11. Favre, supra note 7, at xxvii.
12. See id. at xxiii.
13. See Tischler & Myers, supra note 8, at 391–98.
14. Amy Quinton, Cows and Climate Change: Making Cattle More Sustainable, UC
DAVIS (June 27, 2019), https://www.ucdavis.edu/food/news/making-cattle-more-sustainable/
[https://perma.cc/9GTC-9F2N].
15. Tischler & Myers, supra note 8, at 395.
16. Id. at 401.
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their breach.17 Nonhuman animals and nature, then, are only protected by the
law to the degree they are valuable to humans, and that value does not always
outweigh other human interests.
The interests of animal welfare advocates and environmentalists
converge at changing the valuation and balancing of interests. “To effectively
protect nature and animal interests under the law, the law must recognize and
respect their value, not only their value to humans as resources or private
property, but their intrinsic value in their own right.”18 But that valuation will
not change until we transform the laws that dictate how we see nonhuman
animals. And ultimately, the hypothesis underlying this article is that it does
not matter if the focus is on individual animals or animal species or other
elements of nature so long as humans construct a legal system that allows
both humans and nonhumans to value the individual and wholistic interests
of nature.
II. SEE NO EVIL, HEAR NO EVIL: MASKING THE ANIMAL AND
ENVIRONMENTAL ABUSES OF FACTORY FARMING
The feature-length Australian documentary Dominion19 presents an
uncompromising, unrelenting, and damning view of animal agriculture.
“Focusing on the legal, industry-standard practices that occur all over the
world,” the documentary is two hours of film taken from hidden cameras and
drones in factory farms and slaughterhouses, showing both “the terrifying
scale of an empire built on secrecy—and the individual stories of its victims,”
ultimately questioning “the morality and validity of humankind’s dominion
over the animal kingdom, [and] advocating not for minor improvements to
their welfare but for a deeper conversation about our right to exploit those
we deem inferior to ourselves.”20
Dominion was filmed in Australia, but other than the scale of the
industry and its abuses (many more animals are bred and slaughtered in U.S.
animal agriculture), there are few differences between the horrors shown in
the film and the same horrors that are largely hidden in the U.S.21 In fact,
much of the footage in the film would have been illegal to obtain in the U.S.
Indeed, even though the film’s director was the first person in Australia
charged under that country’s ag-gag law (for an earlier film),22 his perception
after making Dominion is that “it is clear as an Australian that our animal
17. Joan E. Schaffner, Valuing Nature in Environmental Law: Lessons for Animal Law
and the Valuation of Animals, in WHAT CAN ANIMAL LAW LEARN FROM ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW?, supra note 7, at 243.
18. Id.
19. DOMINION (Aussie Farms 2018).
20. Dominion: About the Film, AUSSIE FARMS REPOSITORY, https://www.
dominionmovement.com/ [https://perma.cc/RP9W-2YRJ].
21. Q&A with Chris Delforce, Writer & Director of Dominion, AUSSIE FARMS
REPOSITORY, https://www.dominionmovement.com/about [https://perma.cc/Z5CT-2ESG].
22. Id.
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agriculture sector strongly envies the ag-gag laws and Animal Enterprise
Terrorism Act successfully introduced [in the U.S.].”23 But the fact that
Dominion has been screened around the world, receiving both widespread
acclaim and push-back24 for its powerful truth-telling, demonstrates that
humans may not be willing to tolerate the animal cruelty and environmental
degradation caused by modern animal agriculture once they know about it.
The terminology describing how animals are raised for food—
intensive animal farming, industrial livestock production, factory farms,
concentrated animal feeding operations—most decidedly does not conjure
visions of happy cows, lush, green fields, or clear, cool streams. Instead, the
images evoked—and indeed, the realities—are ugly and dystopian. An
“animal feeding operation” is a “lot or facility” where animals are “confined
and fed” for a period of time, but crops and other vegetation are not grown.25
CAFOs are animal feeding operations that are defined by large numbers of
animals.26
More than ninety-nine percent of the estimated ten billion animals
raised and slaughtered annually in the U.S. are raised and slaughtered in
CAFOs.27 This method of raising animals for food is harmful certainly to the
animals, but also to the environment and ultimately to humans. “In addition
to causing unquantifiable animal suffering, CAFOs put independent family
farmers out of business, and they create deplorable working conditions for
employees. CAFOs also create massive externalities in the form of
environmental destruction while they ravage their vulnerable host
communities and trample civil rights.”28 At the end of 2018, the
Environmental Protection Agency reported 20,382 CAFOs in the U.S.29
The horrific animal abuses common in CAFOs are well-documented,
mostly by animal welfare activists working undercover. Abuses in the
industry have been described in case law, ironically not because the treatment
of animals is illegal, but because documenting that treatment or attempting
to regulate it are often challenged in court.30 The confinement of laying hens
23. Id.
24. Joely Mitchell, Industry Braces for Documentary Backlash, QUEENSLAND COUNTRY
LIFE (Apr. 4, 2018, 6:50 PM), https://www.queenslandcountrylife.com.au/story/5320974/
industry-braces-for-documentary-backlash/?cs=4710 [https://perma.cc/HS2A-628R].
25. 40 C.F.R. § 122.23 (2018).
26. Id.
27. Christine Ball-Blakely, CAFOs: Plaguing North Carolina Communities of Color,
18 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 4, 4 (2017).
28. Id.
29. NPDES CAFO Permitting Status Report, EPA (Dec. 31, 2018), https://www.
epa.gov/sites/production/files/2019-09/documents/cafo_tracksum_endyear_2018.pdf [https://
perma.cc/Q8X9-2AFR].
30. E.g., Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Wasden, 878 F. 3d 1184 (9th Cir. 2018) (describing
“disturbing” abuses at an Idaho dairy farm and partially overturning Idaho’s ag-gag law);
Ass’n des Éleveurs de Canards et d’Oies du Quebec v. Becerra, 870 F.3d 1140, 1143 (9th Cir.
2017), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 862 (2019) (describing the process of force-feeding geese to
produce foie gras); Nat’l Meat Ass’n v. Brown, 599 F.3d 1093 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d sub nom.
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and breeding sows is perhaps the most well-known issue, and the coverage
has pressured the food industry to demand changes31 and states to enact laws
limiting or banning the practice.32 Other largely unknown to the public
standard industry practices are just as harmful to animals but are legal
precisely because they are standard industry practices.33 Even people who are
aware of the facilities in their area rarely see inside the barns,
slaughterhouses, and processing plants.
The environmental impacts of farming have been recognized for
hundreds of years. In 1610, William Aldred successfully sued his neighbor
for nuisance for “erecting a hogstye so near the house of the plaintiff that the
air thereof was corrupted.”34 The court determined that “if the stopping of the
wholesome air, etc. gives cause of action, a fortiori an action lies in the case
at Bar for infecting and corrupting the air.”35 CAFOs are the source of
Nat’l Meat Ass’n v. Harris, 565 U.S. 452 (2012) (describing cruelty to non-ambulatory cattle
at a California slaughterhouse recorded in an undercover film). Not all of the abuse in these
cases was legal, but none of the cases were criminal cases based on the underlying abuse.
31. See Maggie Fitzgerald, Beyond Meat’s Stock Pops on Report that Meatless
Companies Are Struggling to Meet Demand, CNBC (June 4, 2019, 10:07 AM), https://www.
cnbc.com/2019/06/04/beyond-meats-stock-pops-on-report-that-meatless-companies-arestruggling-to-meet-demand.html [https://perma.cc/XF8T-3JUF].
32. See Lydia Mulvany & Leslie Patton, Entire West Coast Goes Cage-Free on Eggs as
Oregon Signs On, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 15, 2019, 1:01 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2019-08-15/entire-west-coast-goes-cage-free-on-eggs-as-oregon-signs-on
[https://perma.cc/NU8N-5M77].
33. Dominion sheds light on many. The Aussie Farms Repository has a collection of
photos, videos, documents, and other resources documenting “beyond doubt that animal abuse
[is] not only commonplace, but in fact inherent to industries that exploit or use animals for
profit. Aussie Farms operates under the belief that these industries rely on secrecy and
deception, using marketing ploys such as ‘humanely slaughtered’ and ‘free range’, and
imagery depicting happy animals living out their days on rolling green hills in the sunshine;
and that by breaking down this secrecy and making it easier for consumers to see the truth
about what their purchases support, the commercialised abuse and exploitation of animals will
slowly but surely come to an end.” About Aussie Farms, AUSSIE FARMS REPOSITORY,
https://www.aussiefarms.org.au/about [https://perma.cc/VRX4-FBG9]. Although both
Dominion and the Aussie Farms Repository focus on Australian factory farming, the
documented practices are pervasive industry standards worldwide.
34. William Aldred’s Case, (1610) 77 Eng. Rep. 816, 816 cited in Jonathan Morris,
Comment, “One Ought Not Have So Delicate a Nose”: CAFOs, Agricultural Nuisance, and
the Rise of the Right to Farm, 47 ENVT’L L. 261, 263–64 (2017).
35. Aldred’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 821. In the U.S. too, the odorous air pollution from
animal agriculture drew successful nuisance suits. E.g., Commonwealth v. Van Sickle, 7 Pa.
L.J. 82 (Pa. 1845), cited in Morris, supra note 34, at 270–71) (facility housing 1,000 hogs that
created a stench “so intolerable as to make it almost impossible to pass through the street . . .
without nausea” determined to be a nuisance). With the rise and growth of industrialized
agriculture and CAFOs, states began to prohibit nuisance claims against agricultural
operations via “right to farm” statutes intended to protect investment in agricultural operations.
Id. at 276. In most states, animal agriculture is protected by these statutes. Id. at 278. A more
recent trend in agricultural protections is adoption of constitutional right to farm and ranch
provisions in state constitutions, protecting agricultural operations from state regulation. Id. at
283. Ag-gag laws—the intermediate step between statutory right to farm laws and the more
recent constitutional protections—are another layer of protection for animal agriculture that is
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tremendous air and water pollution. Groundwater pollution in the form of
harmful nitrates and pathogens comes from waste lagoons, storm run-off, and
flooding in areas near CAFOs.36 In North Carolina alone, the pork industry
produces over ten billion gallons of waste water annually.37 CAFOs also emit
very high levels of ammonia, hydrogen sulfide, methane, particulate matter,
and 400 other volatile compounds into the air.38 Methane, which is produced
both by the animals themselves and the decay of manure in waste lagoons, is
a significant contributor to climate change.39 One estimate posits that CAFOs
produce seventy-five percent of the ammonia pollutants in the U.S.40 The
noxious gases produced by waste lagoons have sickened and even killed farm
workers.41 Nevertheless, in 2008, the EPA partially exempted CAFOs from
reporting release of hazardous substances into the air because, “in most cases,
a federal response is impractical and unlikely.”42 The D.C. Circuit vacated
that final rule, saying, “In light of the record, we find those reports aren’t
nearly as useless as the EPA makes them out to be.”43
The response of states to the suffering and damage caused by CAFOs
has not been to regulate CAFOs to improve factory farming, but instead to
enact laws that keep the harms secret. In 2008, an undercover video released
by the Humane Society of the United States showed unspeakable torture of
downed cows inside the Westland/Hallmark Meat Packing Company in
Chino, California, which supplied the National School Lunch Program. The
backlash from the video led to the country’s largest beef recall, criminal
charges against two workers, a massive settlement, the demise of the

clearly a response to animal welfare advocates trying to document the conditions inside animal
agriculture operations. Ariel Overstreet-Adkins, Essay, Extraordinary Protections for the
Industry That Feeds Us: Examining a Potential Constitutional Right to Farm and Ranch in
Montana, 77 MONT. L. REV. 85, 87 (2016).
36. Ball-Blakely, supra note 27, at 5.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 6; CARRIE HRIBAR, UNDERSTANDING CONCENTRATED ANIMAL FEEDING
OPERATIONS AND THEIR EFFECT ON COMMUNITIES 5–6 (2010), https://www.cdc.gov/nceh/ehs/
docs/understanding_cafos_nalboh.pdf [https://perma.cc/NJ6F-6R5G].
39. HRIBAR, supra note 38, at 7.
40. Ball-Blakely, supra note 27, at 6.
41. Id.
42. CERCLA/EPCRA Administrative Reporting Exemption for Air Releases of
Hazardous Substances from Animal Waste at Farms, 73 FED. REG. 76,948, 76,956 (Dec. 18,
2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 302, 355).
43. Waterkeeper All. v. EPA, 853 F.3d 527, 530 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
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company,44 and a special hearing before a U.S. Senate Subcommittee.45 This
was not an isolated case, and other undercover video footage showed
widespread cruelty and violation of food safety laws in the U.S. animal
agriculture industry.46 Although individual perpetrators and the facilities may
have been held accountable, instead of tightening laws and enforcement to
ensure the integrity of the U.S. food supply, several states reacted to the
undercover videos not with alarm at the treatment of the animals but with
alarm that undercover videos like these could endanger the industry. These
states introduced bills, known as ag-gag laws, to prevent not the mistreatment
of the animals, but the filming or photographing of the mistreatment.47
Early ag-gag laws were purportedly enacted to combat agroterrorism
(linked to ecoterrorism) and were intended to protect against property
damage in animal industries including CAFOs and animal research
facilities.48 Even so, they contained provisions prohibiting undercover
filming and photographing,49 suggesting that the objective of combatting
“terrorism” was not the whole story. In any case, these provisions
foreshadowed the post-Westland/Hallmark laws, which were clearly focused
on preventing not property damage, but the economic damage50 that would
result if consumers had a view behind the scenes of the animal agriculture
industry. The ag-gag laws that were introduced in twenty-five states after
Westland/Hallmark are generally characterized as either agricultural
interference laws that ban recording in agricultural facilities without consent
or distributing such a recording; agricultural fraud laws that prohibit gaining
entrance to agricultural facilities under false pretenses, including
misrepresenting oneself on an employment application; or rapid reporting
44. Helena Bottemiller, Landmark Settlement Reached in Westland-Hallmark Meat
Case, FOOD SAFETY NEWS (Nov. 18, 2012), https://www.foodsafetynews.com/2012/11/
landmark-settlement-reached-in-westlandhallmark-meat-case/
[https://perma.cc/98ZRCT92]; Jane Zhang, Meatpacker Admits Ailing Cattle Used at Slaughterhouse, WALL STREET
J. (Mar. 13, 2008, 12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB120533310279730335
[https://perma.cc/LR2Z-BCAF]; Meatpacker to Shut Down Permanently After Recall: Report,
REUTERS (Feb. 24, 2008, 12:15 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hallmark-westlandmeat/meatpacker-to-shut-down-permanently-after-recall-report-idUSN24205620080224
[https://perma.cc/7ZTZ-9B3L].
45. See Hallmark/Westland Meat Recall: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Agric.,
Rural Devel., Food and Drug Admin. & Related Agencies of the S. Comm. on Appropriations,
110th Cong. (Feb. 28, 2008), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-110shrg44333/
html/CHRG-110shrg44333.htm [https://perma.cc/7P8A-X2CX].
46. Alicia Prygoski, Detailed Discussion of Ag-gag Laws, ANIMAL LEGAL & HIST. CTR.
(2015),
https://www.animallaw.info/article/detailed-discussion-ag-gag-laws
[https://
perma.cc/ZEZ8-UTHB].
47. Id.; Mark Bittman, Who Protects the Animals?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2011,
9:29 PM), https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/04/26/who-protects-the-animals/
[https://perma.cc/XJC7-D5WZ]. Bittman is credited with coining the term “ag-gag.”
48. Prygoski, supra note 46. Montana, Kansas, and North Dakota passed this type of
ag-gag law in the 1990s. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
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laws that require reporting of animal cruelty within twenty-four to twentyeight hours.51 Rapid reporting laws are especially problematic because they
seem like they are meant to combat animal cruelty, but really prevent
whistleblowers from acquiring evidence of a pattern of abuse over time.52
These laws have not gone unchallenged. Indeed, although they were
introduced in twenty-five states between 2011 and 2015, they passed in only
six.53 Utah’s law (a combined agricultural interference/agricultural fraud
law),54 Idaho’s (also a combined agricultural interference/agricultural fraud
law),55 and Iowa’s (an agricultural fraud law) have been challenged on First
Amendment free speech and Fourteenth Amendment equal protection
grounds.56 All three were initially held unconstitutional.57 The Ninth Circuit
reversed the District of Idaho regarding the agricultural fraud portions of
Idaho’s law, but the agricultural interference portions remain enjoined.58 The
validity of the Iowa statute is on appeal, but just after the appeal was filed,
the Iowa legislature passed another version of an agricultural fraud statute,59
which is also now being challenged on First and Fourteenth Amendment
grounds.60
Perhaps to avoid the Fourteenth Amendment challenges, the most
recent incarnation of ag-gag laws prohibit undercover investigation of abuses
not just at agricultural and research facilities but at all businesses.61 Lawsuits
have been filed seeking to enjoin enforcement of the new statutes in Arkansas
and North Carolina.62 But expanding the scope of ag-gag laws to include all
corporate misconduct is going in the wrong direction. The better course of
action would be repeal.
This new expansion of ag-gag laws is alarming. In order to protect
the cruel and environmentally damaging practices of industrial animal
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-112 (West 2019), held unconstitutional by Animal Legal
Def. Fund v. Herbert, 263 F. Supp. 3d 1193, 1213 (D. Utah 2017).
55. IDAHO CODE § 18-7042 (2019), held unconstitutional by Animal Legal Def. Fund v.
Otter, 118 F. Supp. 3d 1195, 1211–12 (D. Idaho 2015), aff’d in part, rev’d in part by Animal
Legal Def. Fund v. Wasden, 878 F.3d 1184, 1190 (9th Cir. 2018); IOWA CODE § 717A.3A
(2019), held unconstitutional by Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Reynolds, 353 F. Supp. 3d 812,
826–27 (S.D. Iowa 2019), appeal filed, No. 19-1364 (8th Cir. Feb. 22, 2019).
56. Prygoski, supra note 46.
57. Herbert, 263 F. Supp. 3d at 1213; Otter, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 1211–12; Reynolds, 353
F. Supp. 3d at 826–27.
58. Wasden, 878 F.3d at 1205.
59. IOWA CODE § 717A.3B (2019).
60. Complaint, Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Reynolds, No. 4:19-cv-00124 (S.D. Iowa
Apr. 22, 2019).
61. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-118-113 (2019); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99A-2 (2018). The two
statutes are virtually identical.
62. Animal Leg. Def. Fund v. Vaught, No. 4:19-cv-00442 (E.D. Ark. June 25, 2019);
PETA v. Stein, 737 F. App’x. 122, 125 (4th Cir. June 5, 2018) (reversing the lower court’s
determination that the plaintiffs had no standing and allowing the lawsuit to go forward).
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agriculture, legislators are willing to protect corporate misconduct across the
board. This underscores the fact that these laws really protect social
injustices. The director of Dominion says that the film is “about levelling the
playing field by showing consumers of animal products what they’re actually
paying for—giving them the chance to make informed decisions and
hopefully, encouraging a more compassionate and critically-thinking society
where misleading advertising is no longer taken at face value.”63 But abuses
inherent in industrial animal agriculture have a much deeper impact than the
behavior of American consumers. Industrial animal agriculture notoriously
preys on immigrants—especially undocumented immigrants—who may
have no choice but to work in inhumane conditions.64
[One company] has built its business by recruiting some of
the world’s most vulnerable immigrants, who endure harsh
and at times illegal conditions that few Americans would put
up with. When these workers have fought for higher pay and
better conditions, the company has used their immigration
status to get rid of vocal workers, avoid paying for injuries,
and quash dissent.65
CAFOs are often located in economically disadvantaged areas, often
near communities of color, where vulnerable residents do not have the
opportunities or resources to move or ameliorate the deleterious impacts of
the CAFOs.66
Ag-gag laws allow the animal agriculture industry to hide practices
that prey on vulnerable people, animals, and ecosystems, and they mask the
social and ethical issues created by the industry. Allowing corporations to
hide the evils inherent in the food system that is crucial to our survival does
not make humans better, healthier, or safer.

63. Dominion: About the Film, supra note 20.
64. It is likely not a coincidence that U.S. immigration officials selected the chicken
processing industry for massive simultaneous raids that resulted in almost 700 arrests for
immigration violations. See Rogelio V. Solis & Jeff Amy, Largest US Immigration Raids in a
Decade Net 680 Arrests, AP (Aug. 7, 2019), https://www.apnews.com/bbcef8ddae4e43039
83c91880559cf23 [https://perma.cc/BY9G-YLMW].
65. Michael Grabell, Cut to the Bone: How a Poultry Company Exploits Immigration
Laws, NEW YORKER, May 8, 2017, at 46.
66. See generally Ball-Blakely, supra note 27.
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III. STANDING ON THEIR OWN FOUR FEET: LEGAL STANDING FOR
ANIMALS AND THE ENVIRONMENT67
In May 2019, the United Nations released a report that revealed the
shocking reality that one million plant and animal species are in danger of
extinction due to human activity.68 The report alarmingly states:
Human actions threaten more species with global extinction
now than ever before. An average of around 25 per cent of
species in assessed animal and plant groups are threatened
. . . suggesting that around 1 million species already face
extinction, many within decades, unless action is taken to
reduce the intensity of drivers of biodiversity loss. Without
such action there will be a further acceleration in the global
rate of species extinction, which is already at least tens to
hundreds of times higher than it has averaged over the past
10 million years.69
Although this may be the direst warning yet, it is not the first
recognition that humans have an interest in preserving biodiversity. In 1972,
President Nixon, in announcing his environmental agenda, recognized “that
even the most recent act to protect endangered species, which dates only from
1969, simply does not provide the kind of management tools needed to act
early enough to save a vanishing species.”70 Nixon proposed a law that
“would make the taking of endangered species a Federal offense for the first
time, and would permit protective measures to be undertaken before a species
is so depleted that regeneration is difficult or impossible.”71
Hearings on endangered species legislation confirmed that:
[s]ome sort of protective measures must be taken to prevent
the further extinction of many of the world’s animal species.
The number of animals on the Secretary of the Interior’s list
of domestic species that are currently threatened with
extinction is now 109. On the foreign list, there are over 300
species. Further, the rate of extinction has increased to where
on the average, one species disappears per year . . . . [M]any
67. This section is based on work published previously and updated recently in Stacey
L. Gordon, The Legal Rights of All Living Things: How Animal Law Can Extend the
Environmental Movement’s Quest for Legal Standing for Non-Human Animals, in WHAT CAN
ANIMAL LAW LEARN FROM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW?, supra note 7, at 211–41 (2d ed. scheduled
for publication May 2020).
68. Diaz et al., supra note 1.
69. Id. at 3.
70. The President’s 1972 Environment Program, 8 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 227
(Feb. 8, 1972).
71. Id.
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of these animals perform vital biological services to
maintain a “balance of nature” within their environments.72
Because of these findings, Congress enacted the Endangered Species
Act (ESA),73 “the most comprehensive legislation for the preservation of
endangered species ever enacted by any nation.”74 The underlying concerns
were important, impassioned, and broad.75 The codified preamble to the law
states:
(1) various species of fish, wildlife, and plants in the United
States have been rendered extinct as a consequence of
economic growth and development untempered by adequate
concern and conservation;
(2) other species of fish, wildlife, and plants have been so
depleted in numbers that they are in danger of or threatened
with extinction;
(3) these species of fish, wildlife, and plants are of esthetic,
ecological, educational, historical, recreational, and
scientific value to the Nation and its people.76
“While each of [the] asserted interests ultimately benefits humanity,
the ESA provides a comprehensive scheme to preserve and protect
endangered species themselves in order to provide those benefits.”77
And yet, at this moment, the ESA itself is in danger. At the same
time the United Nations report of May 2019 was published, the U.S. Fish &
Wildlife Service and National Marine Fisheries Services were rewriting ESA
regulations as ordered by the President.78 When he issued the accompanying
Executive Order, surrounded by industry executives, the President made
clear the purpose of regulatory reform was to benefit industry and spur
economic growth.79 The agencies set about to reinterpret the statutory

72. S. REP. NO. 93-307, at 2 (1973), reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2989, 2989–90,
cited in Katherine A. Burke, Comment, Can We Stand for It? Amending the Endangered
Species Act with an Animal-Suit Provision, 75 U. COLO. L REV. 633, 655 (2004).
73. Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884.
74. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 180 (1978), quoted in Burke, supra
note 72, at 638.
75. See Burke, supra note 72, at 639.
76. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(1)–(3) (2018).
77. Burke, supra note 72, at 639.
78. Enforcing the Regulatory Reform Agenda, Exec. Order No. 13,777, 3 C.F.R. 293
(2018).
79. Remarks on Signing the Executive Order on Enforcing the Regulatory Reform
Agenda, DAILY COMP. PRES. DOCS. (Feb. 24, 2017), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/
DCPD-201700138/pdf/DCPD-201700138.pdf [https://perma.cc/R6UT-5Q3Z].
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language underlying the ESA regulations,80 and amended specific rules
regarding determination of species as threatened, consideration of
unoccupied areas in designation of critical habitat, and presentation of
economic impacts with regard to listing decisions.81 While the
Administration and some in Congress praised the amendments,
environmentalists warn these changes weaken the Act and will make it
difficult to protect vulnerable plant and animal species, while others in
Congress believe the amendments do not go far enough and suggest
amendments to the ESA itself.82 As of this writing, courts are considering
challenges to the new regulations83 at the same time Congress is considering
bills to amend the ESA and weaken it even further.84
While the most immediate task may be to prevent further weakening
of the ESA, the most important task may actually be to reinterpret and amend
it, though probably not in the way most of the bills contemplate. Specifically,
the ESA should be reinterpreted to broaden the definition of injury in citizen
suits and amended to allow for animal suits. The last half of the previous
80. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Revision of the Regulations for
Listing Species and Designating Critical Habitat, 83 Fed. Reg. 35,193, 35,194 (proposed July
25, 2018) (amending 50 C.F.R. pt. 424).
81. The final rule still does not allow consideration of economic impacts in listing
decisions, but it does allow gathering and publishing of that information prior to decision.
Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Regulations for Listing Species and
Designating Critical Habitat, 84 Fed. Reg. 45,020, 45,024–25 (Aug. 27, 2019) (to be codified
at 50 C.F.R. pt. 424).
82. Adam Aton, Endangered Species: Trump Admin Rolls out Rule Changes to Limit
Law’s Reach, GREENWIRE (Aug. 12, 2019), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060931003
[https://perma.cc/4E9W-NMYA].
83. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Bernhardt, No. 4:19-cv-05206 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21,
2019) (lawsuit filed by seven environmental and animal welfare groups and the State of
California); California v. Bernhardt, No. 3:19-cv-06013 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2019) (lawsuit
filed by seventeen states and the District of Columbia).
84. In fact, there are competing bills in Congress. H.R. 4348, 116th Cong. (2019) and
S. 2491, 116th Cong. (2019), both with the stated purpose “[t]o terminate certain rules issued
by the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of Commerce relating to endangered and
threatened species” were introduced on September 17, 2019. The House version would void
the 2019 amendments to the regulation, but the Senate version would also strengthen the ESA
by requiring analysis of climate change impacts in listing decisions. S. 2491 § 3(c).
Meanwhile, the Congressional Western Caucus is working on 19 bills to “modernize” the
ESA. Endangered Species Act and Wildlife, CONGRESSIONAL W. CAUCUS, https://
westerncaucus.house.gov/issues/issue/?IssueID=14890 [https://perma.cc/3WQ6-9XMT].
Rep. Gianforte, who introduced a bill earlier in 2019 mandating that Fish & Wildlife Services
delist the Yellowstone Grizzly without following ESA delisting procedures, H.R. 1445, 116th
Cong. (2019), said that the ESA has “become a bludgeoning tool for frivolous lawsuits from
special interest groups,” and that “ [a]buse of the ESA is also shutting down our forest
management in Montana. It’s been weaponized, and now we’re at a point where we, instead
of managing our forests, we breathe them every summer.” Gianforte Bill Outlines Further
ESA Rollbacks, MONT. PUBLIC RADIO (Sept. 25, 2019), https://www.mtpr.org/post/gianfortebill-outlines-further-esa-rollbacks?fbclid=IwAR3YGtX
kXIA3nXAluqzJ5EaihnBZW6DBR8mqLAVw942fcbYkbBL9G-jypVo [https://perma.cc/
NK2E-VU7L].
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sentence isn’t as radical an idea as it may seem. Justice William O. Douglas
recognized the possibility in 1972:
The critical question of ‘standing’ would be simplified and
also put neatly in focus if we fashioned a federal rule that
allowed environmental issues to be litigated before federal
agencies or federal courts in the name of the inanimate
object about to be despoiled, defaced, or invaded by roads
and bulldozers and where injury is the subject of public
outrage. Contemporary public concern for protecting
nature’s ecological equilibrium should lead to the conferral
of standing upon environmental objects to sue for their own
preservation.85
Standing is the legal doctrine that protects the constitutional
requirement that courts consider only “actual cases and controversies.”86
Adding an animal suit provision to the ESA wouldn’t automatically grant
every animal standing to seek redress for every injury, but it would expand
enforcement of the ESA by allowing lawsuits by those who can most easily
establish injury. Article III standing requires that the plaintiff be able to show
three elements: injury, causation, and redressability.87 If the plaintiff meets
that test, the court must determine whether Congress has specifically
conferred standing. The ESA’s citizen suit provision does that, allowing any
person to bring a civil suit for the enforcement of the ESA on their own
behalf,88 but neither the Constitution nor Congress allows a person to bring a
civil suit to enforce the ESA purely out of interest in animal welfare.89 The
plaintiff must have a personal stake in the lawsuit, which has been defined as
an injury that is “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent and
not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’”90
The U.S. Supreme Court recognized in Sierra Club v. Morton that
environmental degradation can constitute injury: “Aesthetic and
environmental well-being, like economic well-being, are important
ingredients of the quality of life in our society, and the fact that particular
environmental interests are shared by the many rather than the few does not
make them less deserving of legal protection through the judicial process.”91
The standing doctrine does not preclude a plaintiff from bringing a citizen
suit to enforce violations of environmental laws that are causing widespread
85. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 741–42 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citing
Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?—Toward Legal Rights for Natural
Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 450 (1972)).
86. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559–60 (1992).
87. Id. at 560–61.
88. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (2018) (emphasis added).
89. Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 734–35.
90. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
91. 405 U.S. at 734.
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damage, but only if that plaintiff also has a particularized personal injury.92
For example, in Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court held that the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts had standing to challenge the denial of
rulemaking to regulate automobile emissions—which contribute to
worldwide climate change—because, as a coastal property owner,
Massachusetts will suffer a specific and imminent injury as sea levels rise.93
The Court said, “That these climate-change risks are ‘widely shared’ does
not minimize Massachusetts’s interest in the outcome of this litigation.”94
However, virtually all human injury resulting from harm to animals is
subjective.95
Cass Sunstein contends that only three categories of persons will
have personal injuries to sue to protect the interests of animals: those who
suffer informational injuries, those who suffer aesthetic injuries, and those
who suffer competitive injuries.96 The recognition that aesthetic injury is
cognizable for standing purposes is crucial for environmental cases, but in
the face of widespread extinction, it is not enough. In environmental cases—
including ESA cases—aesthetic injuries are based on a desire to observe
nature.97 But, to meet the concrete, particularized, and imminent
requirements for standing, an aesthetic injury must be supported by more
than an expressed desire to observe nature or wildlife. Plaintiffs must have
actual plans to travel to specific places in the foreseeable future in order to
view nature or wildlife or previous activity that suggests similar future
enjoyment of nature or wildlife but for the statutory violation at issue.98 This
threshold showing will be difficult to make when the interest at issue is not
the desire to observe a specific species, but to stop the imminent extinction
of a million species, virtually all of which a specific plaintiff—even an
organizational plaintiff—has never seen and has no plans to ever see. The
interest at issue with these species is not necessarily an aesthetic interest in
observing them, but a common survival interest in not allowing the
destruction of ecosystems that support the biodiversity that is also necessary
for human survival.
Recognizing an ethical injury need not contravene standing
jurisprudence. While it is true that this interest may be common to every
92. Id. at 740.
93. 549 U.S. 497, 521 (2007).
94. Id. at 522.
95. Burke, supra note 72, at 651.
96. Cass R. Sunstein, Standing for Animals (with Notes on Animal Rights), 47 UCLA L.
REV. 1333, 1334–35 (2000).
97. See, e.g., Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488 (2009) (plaintiff desired to
travel to national forests potentially affected by timber sale regulations); Lujan v. Defs. of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (plaintiffs desired to view species endangered by international
projects); Sierra Club, 405 U.S. 727 (plaintiffs wanted to protect wilderness-like quality of
area that would be affected by road construction); Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Glickman, 154
F.3d 426 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (plaintiff had an aesthetic interest in viewing primates living in
humane conditions).
98. See Gordon, supra note 67, at 214–19.
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person, thus allowing virtually anybody to claim standing for redress of the
injury, existing precedent provides limiting guidance. In Animal Legal
Defense Fund v. Glickman, standing was not only found by virtue of the
plaintiff’s past record of visiting the primates daily and being disturbed by
their living conditions, but also on his background, education, and
knowledge.99 This suggests not just aesthetic, but an objective, knowledgebased ethical component to the individual plaintiff’s injury. The requirement
of specific knowledge protects the jurisprudential standing requirement that
the injury must be personal and particularized. This would allow scientists
and animal welfare and environmental organizations to have standing based
not on their aesthetic interests but on scientifically based ethics.100
But if the interest is preserving biodiversity, addressing any
plaintiff’s ethical injury would barely touch the problem; at most, any one
plaintiff’s injury would reach the several species in one ecosystem, hardly
the million that are in danger of extinction. This problem raises another
element of standing—redressability. Redressability requires that “it must be
‘likely,’ as opposed to merely ‘speculative’ that the injury will be ‘redressed
by a favorable decision.’”101 Unless a species population is very small, or the
animal species’ critical habitat covers a small area, it seems unlikely that one
case will save even one species, let alone preserve biodiversity on anything
but a local level. The complexity of environmental harms requires courts to
adopt an interpretation of redressability that allows for incremental solutions,
which the Supreme Court did in Massachusetts v. EPA.102 Other courts have
followed:
The redressability requirement does not require a plaintiff
“to solve all roadblocks simultaneously;” rather, a party may
seek “to tackle one roadblock at a time. . . .” That is
especially true when the harm complained of is
environmental. Given the complexity of the natural world
and the innumerable ways in which human activities affect
the environment, it is rarely possible to say with certainty
that a particular verdict will resolve a particular
environmental harm. Often, environmental harm will result
indirectly from human activity, occurring later in time or
some distance away from the activity that caused it, or after
some intermediate natural process . . . . Environmental harm
may also result from “cumulative impacts,” i.e., impacts
“‘which result[] from the incremental impact of the action
when added to other past, present, and reasonably
99. Glickman, 154 F.3d at 429.
100. See Sunstein, supra note 96, at 1354. Sunstein also suggests scientific injuries as an
alternative to aesthetic ones but separates them from ethical injuries.
101. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (internal citations omitted).
102. 549 U.S. 497, 524 (2007).
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foreseeable future actions . . . .’” Rather than shut the
courthouse doors to real environmental harms, courts have
adopted a practical construction of Article III’s case-orcontroversy-requirement that allows a plaintiff to maintain
an action if it is likely that a favorable verdict will constitute
a meaningful step towards remedying the alleged harm.103
In addition to this judicial fix to the problem of standing to enforce
the ESA, there is a congressional one that, as suggested above, is neither
radical nor impossible: Congress could grant standing to animals. The Ninth
Circuit has already suggested as much:
We see no reason why Article III prevents Congress from
authorizing a suit in the name of an animal, any more than it
prevents suits brought in the name of artificial persons such
as corporations, partnerships or trusts, and even ships, or of
juridically incompetent persons such as infants, juveniles,
and mental incompetents.104
As promising as this sounds, the court has so far been adamant that
animals do not have standing, even though it once appeared that it had
granted standing to an animal,105 and that other courts had followed.106 In
Palila v. Hawaii Department of Land & Natural Resources, the court said
that “[a]s an endangered species . . . the bird (Loxioides bailleui), a member
of the Hawaiian honeycreeper family, also has legal status and wings its way
into federal court as a plaintiff in its own right.”107 However, faced with a
question of animal standing again in Cetacean Community v. Bush, the court
determined that its earlier statement was dicta, “little more than rhetorical
flourishes.”108 Having dismissed its own potential precedent for animal
standing, the court went on to analyze the ESA, National Environmental
Protection Act (NEPA), Marine Mammal Protection Act, and Administrative
Procedures Act (APA), and found that none grant standing to animals.109
More recently, the court doubled-down on this analysis and held that
Congress similarly did not grant animals standing under the Copyright Act.110

103. Cal. Sea Urchin Comm’n. v. Bean, 239 F. Supp. 3d 1200, 1205–06 (C.D. Cal. 2017)
(internal citations omitted).
104. Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169, 1176 (9th Cir. 2004).
105. Palila v. Haw. Dep’t of Land & Nat. Res., 852 F.2d 1106, 1107 (9th Cir. 1988).
106. Marbled Murrelet (Brachyramphus Marmoratus) v. Pac. Lumber Co., 880 F. Supp.
1343, 1346 (N.D. Cal. 1995); Loggerhead Turtle v. Cty. Council of Volusia Cty., 896 F. Supp.
1170, 1177 (M.D. Fla. 1995).
107. Palila, 852 F.2d at 1107.
108. Cetacean Cmty., 386 F.3d at 1174.
109. Id. at 1176–79.
110. Naruto v. Slater, 888 F.3d 418, 425–26 (9th Cir. 2018) (the “monkey-selfie” case).
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Absent an express Congressional mandate, the Ninth Circuit will not find
standing for animals:
The court in Cetacean did not rely on the fact that the
statutes at issue in that case referred to ‘persons’ or
‘individuals.’ Instead, the court crafted a simple rule of
statutory interpretation: if an Act of Congress plainly states
that animals have statutory standing, then animals have
statutory standing. If the statute does not so plainly state,
then animals do not have statutory standing.111
Furthermore, in Naruto v. Slater, the Ninth Circuit found an
additional hurdle for animal standing that would require congressional
action: animals literally cannot speak for themselves, but absent next-friend
status that Congress must grant, neither can anybody else.112 Professor
Sunstein believes that Congress will grant standing to animals.113 About
nonhuman standing, he concludes that:
It would be acceptable for Congress to conclude that a work
of art, a river, or a building should be allowed to count as a
plaintiff or a defendant, and authorize human beings to
represent them to protect their interests. So long as the
named plaintiff would suffer injury-in-fact, the action should
be constitutionally acceptable.114
Regardless of whether the ESA is intended to protect animal and
plant species (the legislative history suggests that it was) or people (the
legislative history suggests that too), the reality is that biodiversity is
essential to the survival of the planet, and humans are rapidly destroying that
biodiversity.115 Both human and nonhuman animals have interests in
preserving the multitude of species, both are injured by actions that harm
species, and both should have access to the courts to seek redress for that
harm.
IV. AND NOW FOR SOMETHING COMPLETELY DIFFERENT:
CONSTRUCTING AN ECOCENTRIC LEGAL SYSTEM
Dominion challenges the idea that humans are superior to and have
dominion over nonhuman animals.116 As we watch the destruction of nature,
111. Id.
112. Id. at 422.
113. Sunstein, supra note 96, at 1359–60.
114. Id. at 1361.
115. Diaz et al., supra note 1.
116. Q&A with Chris Delforce, supra note 21.
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often in the name of human development, we see that the idea of dominion—
and the need to challenge it—is broader than the human/nonhuman animal
binary. Over twenty years ago, Professor Jonathan Wiener charted paradigms
of environmental law that moved from a view in which nature is at a stable
equilibrium, and humans are separate from and superior to nature, to a view
in which nature is dynamic and changing, and humans are part of nature117
(see Table 1 below). In his characterization of the developing paradigms, the
focus of the role of law shifted from exploitation to conservation to
preservation.118 As the paradigms shift through four phases (or “faces” per
Wiener’s nomenclature), the view of humanity shifts from one in which
humans are morally superior to nature, to one in which humans are morally
inferior, to one of moral uncertainty.119
Table 1: Wiener’s “Four Faces of Environmental Law”120
View of Nature

View of Humanity

Role of Law

Stable, vast and resilient,
raw, fearsome

Separate from
nature; morally
superior to nature

Exercise human
dominion over nature;
exploit

Stable, in balance (absent
human disruption);
fragile; wild

Separate from
nature; morally
superior to nature

Exercise benign
stewardship over
nature; conserve

Stable, in balance (absent
human disruption);
fragile, pristine

Separate from
nature; morally
inferior to nature

Protect balance of
nature, untainted by
humans; preserve

Dynamic, in
disequilibrium,
interconnected, chaotic

Part of nature;
morally uncertain

?

Wiener’s contention is that the role of environmental law at any point
in time was derived from society’s views of nature and the moral status of
humans in relation to nature.121 At the time he wrote the article, nature was
understood as dynamic, the “balance of nature” was a fallacy, and humans
were a part of nature and therefore neither morally superior nor inferior;
117. Jonathan Baert Wiener, Beyond the Balance of Nature, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y
F. 1, 3 (1996).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 4.
121. Id. at 5.
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however, absent the human/nonhuman dichotomy in earlier paradigms, it
was unclear what the role of law was.122 Wiener could not fill in the final cell
in the chart—the role of law in this new paradigm—suggesting that the new
paradigm was just “beginning to construct a legal regime that escapes this
dichotomy and is based instead on consequences and on incentives to
promote ecological health.”123
It is safe to assume the predominant paradigm still views nature in
constant disequilibrium and chaos, which it must be if only because there is
no longer any way to argue a nature free from human disruption. However,
even at the time Wiener charted the development of environmental law
paradigms, the idea of a view of humanity that is part of nature and morally
neutral was not as clear, nor necessarily even desirable.124 Given headlines
about mining development, petroleum exploration, deforestation, climate
change, and species extinction, it does seem that humans still view
themselves as morally superior to nature or at least treat nature with moral
ambiguity, because while we have laws that support preservation of nature,
we often interpret them in ways that allow exploitation.125
This may be the crux of the dilemma regarding the role of law in
Wiener’s new paradigm. Because law is a human construct designed to order
human society, decide human disputes, and redress human injury, a paradigm
of the role of law in nature cannot assume a view that humanity is a morally
neutral part of nature because the interest of humans will always dominate.
Indeed, as was discussed in the last section, nonhuman natural elements do
not even have access to the human legal system absent an injury to humans.
The legal system, therefore, has no interest in addressing harms to nature
absent co-occurring harms to humans.
While Wiener tried to define a legal system that would “escape the
dichotomy,” the legal system in Walter Kuhlmann’s paradigm recognizes the
dichotomy but not the moral superiority. Kuhlmann’s ecocentric legal
framework starts with the view of nature as dynamic and interconnected; law,
in his paradigm, “would require greater consideration in the law for species
and habitats and would reduce presumptions in the law in favor of human
desires, i.e. would result in a net change toward a more ecocentric legal
framework.”126 The role of environmental law is not to erase the
human/nonhuman dichotomy in nature, but to create a legal system that
values ecosystems, which humans are a part of but not superior to. The role
of law, then, is to control for dominion and moral superiority. Using language

122. Id. at 2–3, 17.
123. Id. at 17.
124. Walter Kuhlmann, Making the Law More Ecocentric: Responding to Leopold and
Conservation Biology, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 133, 155–57 (1996).
125. See id. at 149–59.
126. Id. at 135.
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from Kuhlmann, the empty cell in Wiener’s chart would read: “Recognize
biotic values; ‘diminish human dominion;’127 cohabit.”
The challenge for this view of environmental law is that legally, plant
and animal species and non-living elements of nature are human property.
Human dominion over nature is, then, embedded in the system. It is not,
however, so intrinsic that it cannot be questioned. Steven Wise and the
NonHuman Rights Project have now filed habeas corpus petitions on behalf
of four chimpanzees and four elephants, seeking not only their release from
captivity, but a determination that they are legal persons.128
Granting legal personhood to nonhuman animals would confer rights
on nonhuman animals, but would neither grant animals human status nor
confer human rights, or even absolute rights that would trump human rights.
If the goal is to create an environmental law paradigm that recognizes the
human/nonhuman dichotomy in ecosystems but considers nonhuman value,
humans and nonhuman should not have identical rights; they should have
rights inherent to their species.129 Constitutional law scholar Laurence Tribe
considered the idea of animal rights and reasoned that they are not so radical
an idea in constitutional jurisprudence.130
The NonHuman Rights cases have moved through the New York
court system, arguing for chimpanzees Tommy, Kiko, Hercules, and Leo,
and are still pending in Connecticut and New York courts on behalf of
elephants Beulah,131 Karen, Minnie, and Happy. None, so far, have been
successful, but they also have not slammed shut the door. In denying
Hercules and Leo’s petition for habeas corpus, Judge Jaffe of the New York
Supreme Court said:
Efforts to extend legal rights to chimpanzees are . . .
understandable; some day they may even succeed. Courts,
however, are slow to embrace change, and occasionally
seem reluctant to engage in broader, more inclusive
interpretations of the law . . . . As Justice Kennedy observed
in Lawrence v. Texas, “times can blind us to certain truths
and later generations can see that laws once thought
necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress.” For now,
however, given the precedent to which I am bound, it is
127. Id. at 160.
128. Litigation: Confronting the Core Issue of Nonhuman Animals’ Legal Thinghood,
NONHUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT, https://www.nonhumanrights.org/litigation/ [https://perma.cc/
N5PV-C9VY].
129. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE 325-407 (2007).
130. Laurence H. Tribe, Ten Lessons Our Constitutional Experience Can Teach Us
About the Puzzle of Animal Rights: The Work of Steven M. Wise, 7 ANIMAL L. 1, 1 (2001).
131. Sadly, Beulah collapsed and died at a state fair in Massachusetts in September 2019.
She was 54 years old. Amanda Woods, Beloved Elephant Beulah Dies of Heart Attack at State
Fair, N.Y. POST (Sept. 26, 2019), https://nypost.com/2019/09/26/beloved-elephant-beulahdies-of-heart-attack-at-state-fair/ [https://perma.cc/6ZQN-ZBN8].

366

BELMONT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 7:343

hereby ordered that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus
is denied.132
In the appeal of Tommy’s case in the New York Court of Appeals,
Judge Fahey concurred with the Court’s denial of the writ, but issued a
stunning opinion:
The question will have to be addressed eventually. Can a
non-human animal be entitled to release from confinement
through the writ of habeas corpus? Should such a being be
treated as a person or as property, in essence a thing? . . . The
inadequacy of the law as a vehicle to address some of our
most difficult ethical dilemmas is on display in this matter
. . . . To treat a chimpanzee as if he or she had no right to
liberty protected by habeas corpus is to regard the
chimpanzee as entirely lacking independent worth, as a mere
resource for human use, a thing the value of which consists
exclusively in its usefulness to others. Instead, we should
consider whether a chimpanzee is an individual with
inherent value who has the right to be treated with respect
. . . . The reliance on a paradigm that determines entitlement
to a court decision based on whether the party is considered
a “person” or relegated to the category of a “thing” amounts
to a refusal to confront a manifest injustice.133
Austrian courts similarly declined to grant personhood to a chimpanzee,
Matthew Hiasl Pan.134
However, other foreign jurisdictions have granted rights to
nonhuman plant and animal species and even to non-living elements of
nature. In 2008, the Spanish Parliament passed a resolution recognizing that
great apes have the right to life and freedom.135 The Supreme Court of India
extended the constitutional right to life to animals in 2014, and in 2019, an
Indian high court recognized all non-human animals as legal entities136 in an
132. Decision & Order, In re NonHuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Stanley, No. 152736/15,
slip. op. at 32 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 29, 2015), available at https://www.nonhumanrights.org/
content/uploads/Judge-Jaffes-Decision-7-30-15.pdf [https://perma.cc/2P8H-8246].
133. Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. ex rel. Tommy v. Lavery, 100 N.E.3d 846, 848 (N.Y.
2018) (Fahey, J., concurring) (mem) (internal citations omitted).
134. Martin Balluch et al., Hiasl: The Whole Story, VGT (Jan. 18, 2008),
https://vgt.at/en/work-pan.php [https://perma.cc/G9AV-PMXC]. The Austrian courts did not
determine the issue of personhood, but instead denied the petition on technical grounds. Id.
135. Lee Glendinning, Spanish Parliament Approves ‘Human Rights’ for Apes, THE
GUARDIAN (June 26, 2008), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/jun/26/human
rights.animalwelfare [https://perma.cc/FB8G-9UJM].
136. Sonia Shad, Indian High Court Recognizes Nonhuman Animals as Legal Entities,
NONHUMAN RIGHTS BLOG (July 10, 2019), https://www.nonhumanrights.org/blog/punjabharyana-animal-rights/ [https://perma.cc/NC2E-J6Q6].
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opinion that echoes Kuhlmann’s ecocentric legal framework.137 An Indian
court has also granted the legal status of “living human entities” to two rivers,
the Ganges and the Yamuna.138 Like India, New Zealand has not generally
granted the status of legal person to nature, but it has granted legal status to
two natural features, the Te Urewera forest,139 and the Whanganui River.140
The people of Ecuador held a national referendum that resulted in a
constitutional amendment that grants to nature the rights “to exist, persist,
maintain and regenerate its vital cycles, structure, functions and its processes
in evolution,” though the constitutional amendment does not confer legal
status.141
Building on all of this, in 2017, the Colorado River Ecosystem filed
a lawsuit in the federal District of Colorado seeking recognition of the river’s
“right to exist, flourish, regenerate, be restored, and naturally evolve.”142
While the court quickly dismissed this case,143 another U.S. river has been
granted personhood status: the Klamath River was declared a legal person by
the Yurok Tribe.144
All of these instances focus either on personhood or rights, but a few
scholars have proposed another legal concept that vests animals only with a
narrow set of rights—property rights—and the standing to enforce them.145
Karen Bradshaw proposes vesting property rights in animals at the ecosystem
level.146 That property would be held in trust and managed for the benefit of
the animals inhabiting that ecosystem, including humans who also would be
one of the animal owners of the ecosystems they inhabit.147 Bradshaw
highlights several benefits to this system, including the practicality that it
137. Singh v. State of Haryana, CRR-533-2013 (Punjab & Hayana HC May 31, 2019),
https://www.livelaw.in/pdf_upload/pdf_upload-361239.pdf [https://perma.cc/X76M-9QV6].
138. Michael Safi, Ganges and Yumana Rivers Granted Same Legal Rights as Human
Beings, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 21, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/21/
ganges-and-yamuna-rivers-granted-same-legal-rights-as-human-beings
[https://perma.cc/
EM9E-E3RW].
139. Te Urewera Act 2014, § 11 (N.Z.).
140. Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui River Claims Settlement) Act 2017, § 14 (N.Z.).
141. Constitución Politica de la Republica del Ecuador (Ecuador), art. 71, quoted in
Gwendolyn J. Gordon, Environmental Personhood, 43 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 49, 54 (2018).
142. Amended Complaint at 3, Colorado River Ecosystem v. Colorado, No. 17-CV02316-NYW (D. Colo. Dec. 3, 2017), quoted in Matthew Miller, Note, Environmental
Personhood and Standing for Nature: Examining the Colorado River Case, 17 U. N.H. L.
REV. 355, 356 (2019).
143. Order, Colorado River Ecosystem v. Colorado, No. 17-CV-02316-NYW (D. Colo.
Dec. 4, 2017), cited in Miller, supra note 142, at 357.
144. Anna V. Smith, The Klamath River Now Has the Legal Rights of a Person, HIGH
COUNTRY NEWS (Sept. 24, 2019), https://www.hcn.org/articles/tribal-affairs-the-klamathriver-now-has-the-legal-rights-of-a-person/print_view [https://perma.cc/Z5FR-PXP5].
145. Karen Bradshaw, Animal Property Rights, 89 U. COLO. L. REV. 809, 815 (2018). See
also JOHN HADLEY, ANIMAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: A THEORY OF HABITAT RIGHTS FOR WILD
ANIMALS (2015). Hadley establishes the philosophical framework for animal property rights,
while Bradshaw builds the legal framework for affording animals those rights.
146. Bradshaw, supra note 145, at 833.
147. Id. at 833–34.
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may be more palatable to courts than granting animals personhood, and the
broader focus that would afford rights to more animals than the current
systems which focus on primates and large mammals.148 This system would
not protect animals from cruelty nor would it protect the animals the
personhood movement seeks to protect—certain wild animals in captivity.149
It would, however, protect habitat and thereby indirectly protect other
elements of nature in ecosystems.
While it seems that comprehensive rights and the status to enforce
them for all of nature is likely a long way off, a legal system that bestows
rights on individual species and elements of nature would necessarily
develop a jurisprudence that values nature in a way that moves us toward that
“ecocentric legal framework” that fractures the destructive idea of human
dominion over the natural world. Humans would have to stop inflicting
unnecessary harm on species and natural elements that could legally stand up
for themselves.
CONCLUSION
Peter Singer defines “speciesism” as “an attitude of bias against a
being because of the species to which it belongs. Typically, humans show
speciesism when they give less weight to the interests of nonhuman animals
than they give to the similar interests of human beings.”150 The term is
properly used to refer to human treatment of animals,151 and as such it can
only provide a partial explanation for human dominion over all of nature, but
it is not difficult to extend the attitude as an explanation for the destruction
of plant species as well, or to the destruction of any other element of nature,
especially as we are bombarded daily with headlines proclaiming the
weakening of environmental protections because they limit human economic
development.
In the context of a legal system that is a human construct, humans
are inherently separate from the rest of nature. Yet humans inhabit and are
part of nature’s ecosystems. A legal system that fosters and allows human
dominion over nature to the extent ecosystems and the nonhuman elements
that they are made of—animal, vegetable, and mineral—are destroyed makes
little sense. Law, however, only values the interests of others to the extent its
makers provide. But law is a human construct, and it can be reconstructed.
Its foundational canons and rules change as society changes; if they did not,
law would become irrelevant. Animal and environmental law, both of which
148. Id. at 848–49.
149. Id. at 849–50.
150. George Yancy & Peter Singer, Peter Singer: On Racism, Animal Rights and Human
Rights, N.Y. TIMES OPINIONATOR (May 27, 2015, 7:00 AM), https://opinionator.blogs.
nytimes.com/2015/05/27/peter-singer-on-speciesism-and-racism/ [https://perma.cc/7N8CS7DE].
151. Speciesism, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/
185996 [https://perma.cc/KY48-UU8G].
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use the legal system to protect nonhuman elements of nature, have never been
as crucial as they are now because what is endangering both human and
nonhuman survival is human attitude and activity. Where animal law and
environmental law intersect is a place to force change. Some changes can
allow humans to advocate for nonhuman interests; other changes must allow
the nonhuman elements of nature to champion their intrinsic value and rights
for themselves.

